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Death on Demand: Proper Medical Treatment?  
 
Richard Huxtable  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Although the message is sometimes lost in translation,1 English law proclaims death-
on-demand to be unlawful.2 Various Parliamentarians have pled the merits of a 
different message, that the unlawful should be rendered lawful.3 Their efforts have 
(yet?) to prove successful. Equally unsuccessful (again, so far) have been numerous 
attempts to petition the courts to lift the ban.4 Despite the Houses’ ongoing 
resistance, the courts continue to insist that only Parliament can pull apart the 
prevailing prohibition.5 So constrained, the judiciary is left to re-state the basic 
message: assisted dying is not lawful.  
According to Lord Mustill, the principled basis for resisting assisted dying is that “the 
interest of the state in preserving life overrides the otherwise all-powerful interest of 
patient autonomy”.6 Mustill is not alone in pointing to the state interest in upholding 
the sanctity of human life.7 Keown suggests that the principle, which opposes the 
intentional ending of innocent human life, has long been a feature of English law 
(and, on his account, rightly so).8 This is no mere theistic and anachronistic 
hangover: article 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998, the right to life, expresses the 
same essential idea in a secular tongue.  
The sanctity of life may dominate whenever death-on-demand enters the courtroom, 
but it is occasionally united with suggestions that vulnerable citizens must be 
protected and dangerously slippery slopes avoided.9 The public interest seems, 
therefore, to comprise various (potentially overlapping10) interests. Yet, these are not 
always spelt out. In this chapter, I outline those indications we have from the 
lawmakers, focussing specifically on the proclaimed integrity of medicine and what 
the claim could – or should – mean in relation to death-on-demand.  
It becomes apparent that medicine is protected in and by the law; “proper medical 
treatment” is exempted from some of the rules that might otherwise inhibit its 
practitioners. Should medically-assisted dying also be exempt? I suggest that 
medicine’s “internal morality” appears not to provide a necessary answer to this 
question and, indeed, that any such answer would be insufficient, since we need 
also to look to the wider public interest. But we will see that this too is a contested 
concept. Ultimately, we cannot escape a values choice, such as that between 
autonomy and the sanctity of human life.  
                                                          
1 See R Huxtable, Euthanasia, Ethics and the Law: From Conflict to Compromise (Routledge-
Cavendish 2007).   
2 “Death on demand” refers to requests for (active) voluntary forms of assistance in dying (i.e. 
voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide), which are motivated by a desire to avoid current or 
anticipated suffering.  
3 E.g. Lord Joffe’s Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill and, more recently, Lord Falconer’s 
Assisted Dying Bill.  
4 E.g. R (on the application of Nicklinson and another) v Ministry of Justice; R (on the application of 
AM) v The Director of Public Prosecutions [2014] UKSC 38 (SC).  
5 E.g. Nicklinson (n 4) [116] (Lord Neuberger), [343]-[344] (Lord Kerr).  
6 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 (HL), 892-893 (Lord Mustill).  
7 See Huxtable (n 1) 131-133. 
8 J Keown, The Law and Ethics of Medicine: Essays on the Inviolability of Life (OUP 2013), 3.  
9 E.g. Nicklinson (n 4) [228]-[232] (Lord Sumption).  
10 E.g. protecting the vulnerable might be connected with upholding the sanctity of life.  
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I do not here seek to specify the “right” choice of values which should guide our laws 
or even the “right” combinations thereof (whatever these might be). I do, however, 
hope to show why appeals to the integrity of medicine, “proper medical treatment”, 
and the public interest cannot do the necessary moral work: this remains work for us 
to do, collectively, as members of a society which is contemplating – and may be 
edging nearer towards – the legalisation of assisted dying.  
 
2. Proper Medical Treatment and the Public Interest  
 
When the demand before the court is “help me to die”, the sanctity of life tends to 
dominate. Yet, other state interests evidently occupy the judges’ minds, although 
these are rarely spelt out. In Robb, however, the demand was “allow me to die”.11 
Thorpe J ruled that hunger-striking Mr Robb could not be forcibly fed, as his decision 
had been competently reached. Thorpe J was refreshingly open about the state 
interests in issue in the case: “(1) preserving life; (2) preventing suicide; (3) 
maintaining the integrity of the medical profession; and (4) protecting innocent third 
parties”.12 In this particular case, autonomy triumphed, since it was judged to 
outweigh the obligation to protect life; furthermore, the refusal of food was not 
considered equivalent to suicide, the integrity of the medical profession was not 
found to be directly engaged, and there were no (pertinent) third parties judged to be 
in need of protection.  
Thorpe J is not alone in citing these particular state interests. In Brady,13 Kay J 
referred to the same list, albeit reaching the opposite conclusion about the legitimacy 
of force-feeding this particular (notorious) prisoner.14 He hoped that the law had not 
reached the point “where the rights of a patient count for everything and other ethical 
values and institutional integrity count for nothing”15 Both judges had acquired their 
lists from a US authority, Thor,16 in which, as in Robb, the patient’s right to refuse 
even life-sustaining intervention had been upheld. In such cases, provided that the 
patient is indeed autonomous, autonomy will outweigh any state interests in 
protecting people or protecting a particular profession. Of course, the possibility 
remains that the order of priority will be reversed in other cases – which is precisely 
what happens when the patient seeks active assistance in dying.  
Given the apparent role that they play in denying death on demand, these different 
state interests invite further investigation, not least the idea that the integrity of the 
medical profession merits protection, including from the autonomous claims of some 
patients. Medicine, it seems, is special, and it deserves special protection. The law 
has accordingly created a special exception, by which doctors can avoid the taint of 
criminality that might otherwise impede their practices. As, again, Lord Mustill 
famously put it: 
“Many of the acts done by surgeons would be very serious crimes if done by 
anyone else, and yet the surgeons incur no liability. Actual consent ... is an 
essential element in this immunity; but it cannot be a direct explanation for it, 
                                                          
11 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Robb [1995] Fam 127 (HC). 
12 Robb (n 11) 131.  
13 R v Collins and Ashworth Hospital Authority ex p Brady [2000] Lloyds Rep Med 355 (HC). 
14 See M Brazier, ‘Do No Harm: Do Patients Have Responsibilities Too?’ (2006) 65 The Cambridge 
Law Journal 397. 
15 Brady (n 13) 367.  
16 Thor v Superior Court 5 Cal 4th 725 (1993). See M Stauch and K Wheat, Text, Cases and Materials 
on Medical Law and Ethics (4th edn, Routledge 2012) 86-92. 
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since much of the bodily invasion involved in surgery lies well above any point 
at which consent could even arguably be regarded as furnishing a defence. 
Why is this so? The answer must in my opinion be that proper medical 
treatment, for which actual or deemed consent is a prerequisite, is in a 
category of its own”.17 
His Lordship had made similar comments in Bland,18 while earlier, in Attorney-
General’s Reference (No 6 of 1980), Lord Lane had referred to “the accepted legality 
of … reasonable surgical interference”, which he judged to be “needed in the public 
interest”.19  
The law therefore suggests that proper medical treatment should be afforded the 
(legal) space to thrive. Notice, in the above passages, that respect for patient 
autonomy (and thus consent) does not wholly determine the propriety of medical 
treatment. Autonomy is a component of proper medical treatment but it does not do 
all of the heavy lifting; quite what does, and therefore what is to count as proper 
medical treatment, and who is to say so, are nevertheless open to interpretation. To 
a significant extent, the law seems content to leave the identification of the precise 
parameters and their policing to the profession itself. The medical profession 
accordingly has the freedom to self-govern, with the General Medical Council (GMC) 
setting the relevant standards and overseeing doctors’ compliance therewith.20 
Doctors who fail to satisfy the GMC’s standards of good medical practice can be 
disciplined and removed from the profession where necessary.21 Notably these 
standards themselves refer to the importance of integrity: individual professionals are 
instructed to behave with integrity, so that public trust can be maintained, in order to 
sustain the integrity of the profession itself.  
The scope afforded to doctors’ views of good doctoring in the quasi-law of the GMC 
is further replicated in the law itself, not least in the all-conquering Bolam standard.22 
According to this standard, which originated in the civil law of clinical negligence, a 
doctor will satisfy the standard of care expected of her if she acts in accordance with 
a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of professionals skilled in that 
particular art. So far, so good, perhaps, at least insofar as this phrase appears 
simply to translate the “reasonable person” standard into the “reasonable doctor” 
standard. Bolam’s reach – indeed, the Bolamisation of medical law – has 
nevertheless caused alarm.23 Doctors’ views about what doctors (should) do has 
certainly proven determinative of all manner of medico-legal dilemmas, from the 
provision of information in the consent process,24 to judging the best interests of 
incapacitated patients,25 to the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment therefrom.26  
But it is not merely the case that the law allows doctors to determine how they 
should do what they do; it is also apparent that doctors are legally entitled to do that 
which the rest of us cannot. The suspension of otherwise general rules does not only 
                                                          
17 R v Brown et al [1993] 2 All ER 75 (HL), 109-110 (Lord Mustill).  
18 Bland (n 6) 891 (Lord Mustill).  
19 (1981) 73 Cr App R 63 (HL), 66.  
20 Medical Act 1983, s 35.  
21 General Medical Council, Good Medical Practice (General Medical Council 2013).  
22 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582.  
23 E.g. J Miola, Medical Ethics and Medical Law: A Symbiotic Relationship (Hart 2007) 14.  
24 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] AC 
871 (HL).   
25 Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 (HL).  
26 Bland (n 6). 
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empower surgeons:27 in life-or-death situations, exceptions are also made,28 such 
that doctors – but not non-doctors – can refrain from providing the necessities for 
life,29 and can run the (admittedly, small) risk of shortening patients’ lives when 
relieving their symptoms.30 The freedom also extends to decisions not to do certain 
things. The courts appear resistant to prescribing for doctors: they will not order 
doctors to act contrary to their clinical judgment.31 The judges will declare the law: 
they will not prescribe the course.  
Doctors are therefore protected and empowered, but they are not entirely free from 
oversight or constraint: the courts will still peer over the shoulders of the doctors and, 
indeed, of the GMC.32 Indeed, the propriety of proper medical treatment is not wholly 
determined by the profession itself. This should not be surprising because, as 
Thorpe J and Kay J indicated, the state’s interests encompass more than the 
integrity of the medical profession. As agents of the state, the judges (and, of course, 
Parliament) will erect boundaries around what even doctors can do, presumably by 
reference to other important state interests. There will sometimes be external, and 
critical, scrutiny of doctors’ practices: Bolitho,33 for example, issued a reminder that 
the courts ultimately assess the defensibility of doctors’ chosen standards.34 The law 
has also moved on from a Bolamised view of information disclosure and the best 
interests of patients.35 Sometimes accepted practices must be modified in the wake 
of court rulings,36 and, occasionally, medical personnel might be at greater risk of 
liability or culpability than the rest of us. For example, prosecution guidance on 
complicity in suicide appears to render doctors particularly vulnerable.37 As such, 
even if doctors are willing in principle to offer this (or any other) form of assisted 
dying, the law currently instructs them not to do so in practice, unless they are willing 
to accept the adverse consequences.38  
The continued illegality of death-on-demand might rest, albeit partially, on doctors’ 
own views of the demerits thereof. Many such professional organisations oppose a 
permissive repositioning of the law, and research reveals a strong palliative care 
ethos in this jurisdiction (doctors in this specialty, at least in this country,39 appear 
                                                          
27 E.g. Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003, s 1(2). 
28 Including for surgeons: Re A (children)(conjoined twins: surgical separation) [2000] 4 All ER 961 
(CA).   
29 E.g. Bland (n 6); Re J (a minor)(wardship: medical treatment) [1991] 1 FLR 366 (CA); see further 
Huxtable (n 1) 123-128. Regarding other healthcare professionals, see G Birchley, ‘Angels of mercy? 
The legal and professional implications of withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment by nurses in England 
and Wales’ (2012) 20 Med Law Rev 337.  
30 R v Adams [1965] Crim LR 365.  
31 E.g. Re J (a minor)(wardship: medical treatment) [1992] 2 FLR 165.   
32 E.g. Medical Act 1983, s 40.  
33 Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232 (HL).  
34 But see M Brazier and J Miola, ‘Bye-Bye Bolam: A medical litigation revolution?’ (2000) 8 Med L 
Rev 85. 
35 See e.g. Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41 (HL), Re A (Medical Treatment: Male Sterilisation) 
[2000] 1 FLR 549 (CA), and Mental Capacity Act 2005, s. 4.  
36 See e.g. Miola (n 23) 173-185. 
37 Director of Public Prosecutions, Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging or 
Assisting Suicide (Crown Prosecution Service, February 2010); General Medical Council, When a 
Patient Seeks Advice or Information about Assistance to Die (General Medical Council, January 
2013).  
38 Although, for whatever reason, prosecutions and convictions are in fact scarce: Huxtable (n 1).  
39 See AV Campbell and R Huxtable, ‘The Position Statement and its commentators: Consensus, 
compromise or confusion?’ (2003) 17 Palliative Medicine 180.  
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resistant to such a development).40 More often, however, the courts explicitly refer to 
protectionist norms, and particularly to the need to uphold the sanctity of life, when 
they rule against assisted dying. In Bland, Lord Keith opined that the sanctity of life 
“is the concern of the state, and the judiciary as one of the arms of the state, to 
maintain”.41 These sentiments echo those of the judge in Thor, who usefully 
identified “two separate but related aspects” to this “paramount concern”: “an interest 
in preserving the life of the particular patient and an interest in preserving the 
sanctity of all life”.42  
So much for what the law happens to say: what should be said? In order to assess 
the appropriateness of the legal prohibition, we need to take a more critical look at 
the apparently prohibitive principles, and particularly the integrity of medicine.  
 
3. Death-on-Demand and the Integrity of Medicine 
 
Permissive proposals for assisted dying typically empower physicians as providers,43 
so surely their professional integrity, and any impact thereon, is a crucial concern? 
However, integrity is a complex concept.44 Personal integrity can be characterised in 
terms of an individual’s deep desires or her identity-conferring values. It can also be 
tethered to general moral constraints: maybe a person only has integrity if she 
stands for something that is objectively morally worthwhile. Benjamin tries to unite 
the accounts: a person of integrity will strive for consistency, in the sense that she 
honours her own values, and also wholeness, since she will be responsive to other 
external values and will, where appropriate, yield to these.45 Balancing these 
competing commitments might prove difficult on occasion but the individual must 
somehow seek to preserve her integrity, if she is to maintain her self-respect.46 
These same concepts – and same challenges – can be encountered amongst 
groups. Any group with a particular identity can be said to possess (or judged to 
lack) integrity. Miller and Brody, for example, suggest that: 
“Professional integrity in medicine represents what it means normatively to be 
a physician; it encompasses the values, norms, and virtues that are distinctive 
and characteristic of physicians. Accordingly, the identity to which 
professional integrity corresponds is tied to a specific social role”.47 
So what, then, is the distinctive identity of medicine and what are the moral 
considerations to which it gives rise, as well as those with which it should engage?  
In seeking to answer these questions, various commentators have contemplated the 
“internal morality” of medicine,48 along the lines first explored by Fuller, in his 
                                                          
40 C Seale, ‘National survey of end-of-life decisions made by UK medical practitioners’ (2006) 20 
Palliative Medicine 3.  
41 Bland (n 6) 859 (Lord Keith). 
42 Thor (n 16) [8].  
43 Contrast e.g. S Ost, ‘The De-medicalisation of Assisted Dying: Is a Less Medicalised Model the 
Way Forward?’ (2010) 18 Med Law Rev 497. 
44 D Cox, M Le Caze and M Levine, ‘Integrity’ (2013) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E.N. 
Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/integrity/ (accessed May 8, 2014). 
45 M Benjamin, Splitting the Difference: Compromise and Integrity in Ethics and Politics (University 
Press of Kansas 1990). 
46 See e.g. DP Sulmasy ‘What is conscience and why is respect for it so important?’ (2008) 29 
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 135, 136.  
47 FG Miller and H Brody, ‘Professional integrity and physician-assisted death’ (1995) 25 Hastings 
Center Report 8, 9.  
48 See e.g. RM Veatch, ‘The Impossibility of a Morality Internal to Medicine’ (2001) 26 Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy 621, 622.  
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examination of the internal morality of law. Fuller sought to identify the nature of the 
particular practice and the norms its practitioners should observe, if the practice is to 
succeed (or even be labelled) as such a practice. This was a conceptual quest, not 
an empirical enquiry,49 and we too are interested here in what medicine involves and 
entails by definition, irrespective of the values its practitioners happen in fact to 
espouse.50  
The basic structure of Fuller’s account is as follows. For Fuller, law (making) is the 
enterprise of guiding people’s behaviour via rules.51 From here arises an overarching 
obligation, implicit in the nature of the enterprise: there must be rules, which are 
capable of guiding the relevant subjects. From this end, there then arise more 
specific instrumental obligations: the lawmaker should issue rules (as opposed to 
specific edicts), which should be clear, constant, non-contradictory, promulgated, 
prospective, possible of performance, and administered in a manner that is 
congruent with their official articulation.  
Accounts of the internal morality of medicine can be re-constructed along Fullerian 
lines.52 First, consider Pellegrino’s account,53 which builds on work by MacIntyre,54 
and (especially) Kass.55 For Pellegrino, (clinical) medicine appears to be the 
enterprise of promoting and protecting the good of the whole person of the patient, 
with particular reference to his or her health. From here arises an overarching 
obligation: to serve the patient’s good, the clinician should promote and protect the 
medical good (which requires technical competence), the good as perceived by the 
patient (which requires respect for their autonomous wishes), the good for the patient 
as a human being, and the spiritual good. From this end, there then arise more 
specific instrumental obligations, which Pellegrino depicts as virtues that should be 
exhibited by the medical practitioner, if she is to serve the end of the person’s 
(overall) good: fidelity to trust; suppression of self-interest; intellectual honesty; 
compassion; courage; and prudence (so that the best means are chosen).  
Miller and Brody offer an alternative account, according to which (clinical) medicine 
is a multi-faceted enterprise, which encompasses healing, promoting health, and 
helping patients to achieve dignified and peaceful deaths. From here arise the 
overarching obligations on medicine’s practitioners: to heal, promote health, and help 
patients to achieve dignified and peaceful deaths. From these ends arise 
instrumental obligations on the practitioners: to be competent; to avoid harms when 
conferring benefits; to avoid fraudulent misrepresentation (and departure from 
accepted standards); and to maintain fidelity to the therapeutic relationship (thus 
maintaining patients’ trust). 
There are striking differences between these accounts. First, there is a significant 
difference between, on the one hand, Fuller’s internal morality of law and, on the 
                                                          
49 Similar distinctions between what is and should be the case feature in analyses of the Bolam (n 22) 
standard: e.g. Miola (n 23) 11-12. 
50 Veatch (n 48) 623-5 , 627. Of course, these elements can be difficult to disentangle: as an 
autonomous individual, I can presumably choose my values, and perhaps so can a profession, if we 
link integrity to identity or desires. Big shifts in the values might mean that I, or the profession, 
become something other. I will leave such disentanglement to others.  
51 LL Fuller, The Morality of Law (revised edn, Yale University Press 1969), 106.  
52 Although particular theorists might disagree, Veatch suspects that such accounts commonly look to 
an “end” or “goal” for medicine: Veatch (n 48) 627. 
53 ED Pellegrino, ‘The Internal Morality of Clinical Medicine: A Paradigm for the Ethics of the Helping 
and Healing Professions’ (2001) 26 Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 559. 
54 A MacIntyre, After Virtue (3rd edn, University of Notre Dame Press 2007).  
55 LR Kass, ‘Regarding the end of medicine and the pursuit of health’ (1975) 40 Public Interest 11.  
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other, both of the attempts to specify the internal morality of medicine. Fuller had 
positioned himself amongst jurisprudence’s natural lawyers, rather than its legal 
positivists. As such, he believed there to be a necessary connection between law 
and morality. Fuller suggested, for example, that his desiderata provided the ground-
rules for social co-existence, and that their observance “affects and limits the 
substantive aims that can be achieved through law”, which thereby made them 
moral.56  
Critics like Hart disputed the “morality” of Fuller’s internal principles.57 Certainly, 
Fuller seemed to stop short of supplying any substance to the ends of law; his 
account has a degree of moral content and orientation,58 but it is less substantive 
than other natural law theories.59 Of course, neither Pellegrino nor Miller and Brody 
are so reticent about stipulating the substantive ends of medicine. Fuller’s definition 
of law, and his ensuing norms, appeared to leave open important questions about 
the appropriate moral content that the rules should capture. The theorists of the 
internal morality of medicine, however, appear to beg such questions – they seem to 
insist that there are particular moral messages that medicine should be imparting 
about particular activities. These accounts, therefore, beg the specific question about 
the moral permissibility of physicians offering death on demand. But here a second 
difference emerges: Pellegrino insists that assisted dying is written out of medicine 
(as unacceptable by definition), while Miller and Brody take the opposite view.  
Pellegrino’s prohibitive position is initially apparent from his alignment with Kass. 
According to Kass, medicine is an inherently ethical practice, which is orientated 
towards the end of health. Its internal values are explicitly said to encompass the 
injunction: “do not kill”.60 Pellegrino follows Kass’ Aristotelian approach, explicitly 
adopting an essentialist, teleological and realist position.61 His promotion of a 
transcendent and spiritual account of the good, rather than one autonomously 
chosen by the individual, ultimately reveals his fundamental allegiance to Roman 
Catholic values: “What the patient describes as good for himself – cloning, let us say, 
or self-mutilation, human embryo research, euthanasia – may violate the good for 
humans or the spiritual good. The good perceived as good by the patient is not to be 
a moral law in itself”.62 Since medicine is aimed at the good, which on this definition 
excludes assistance in dying, physicians’ provision of assistance in dying would 
violate the integrity of medicine.  
While Pellegrino and Kass evince Hippocratic beneficence,63 and postulate a 
prohibitive position on assisted dying, Miller and Brody point to a permissive position. 
Miller and Brody anticipate an allegation of question-begging, for including in 
medicine’s goals the provision of a dignified death.64 They, quite reasonably, note 
that some advocates of this goal nevertheless resist the allure of assisted dying,65 so 
they see no necessary connection between this goal and that activity. But they still 
                                                          
56 Fuller (n 51), 184.  
57 HLA Hart, ‘Review: Fuller, The Morality of Law’ (1965) 78 Harvard Law Review 1281.  
58 See R Huxtable, Law, Ethics and Compromise at the Limits of Life: To Treat or not to Treat? 
(Routledge 2012), 18-20. 
59 E.g. J Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press 1986); D Beyleveld and R 
Brownsword, Law as a Moral Judgment (revised edn, Sheffield Academic Press 1994).   
60 Kass (n 55).  
61 Pellegrino (n 53) 560.  
62 Pellegrino (n 53) 572. 
63 Cf. B Freedman, ‘A Meta-Ethics for Professional Morality’ (1978) 89 Ethics 1.  
64 Miller and Brody (n 47) 11.  
65 E.g. D Callahan, The Troubled Dream of Life (Simon and Schuster 1993).  
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happen to think that the activity can be considered compatible with the medical 
enterprise – so, presumably, they perceive some sort of necessary connection. 
Admittedly, they do not place any doctor under a duty to assist in dying; instead, they 
leave this to the doctor’s discretion, suggesting at most that it can be “justifiable only 
as a last resort”.66  
As such, Miller and Brody critique the prohibitionists (specifically, Kass) and they 
argue that medicine’s core concern with respect for the person need not rule out 
assisted dying.67 The willing doctor will still need to be competent: she should not, for 
example, offer assistance in dying, when palliative care “is capable of relieving 
patients’ suffering to a satisfactory degree”.68 But such care should not be imposed 
on patients.69 Nor should death always be regarded as more harmful than beneficial. 
However, the physician is no mere technician or tool of the patient: professional 
integrity “excludes physician assistance on demand”,70 so the physician must still “be 
convinced that this course is the best option for the dire situation of this particular 
patient”.71 Miller and Brody admit that assistance in dying will lie outside mainstream 
practice, so willing professionals might plausibly be charged with fraudulent 
misrepresentation. Despite this, they suggest that departures from accepted 
standards can be justified (as is the case with research), provided that there are 
suitably robust qualifying criteria, which encompass medical indications (such as the 
patient’s suffering and their mental capacity), as well as the patient’s subjective 
appraisal of their situation. They finally submit that trust need not be abused, nor 
patients abandoned, if a policy that permits assisted dying is formulated along such 
careful lines.72 
Momeyer works towards similar conclusions. He finds Kass’ promotion of Hippocratic 
ideals to be too vague, general and selective: for example, robust adherence to a 
Hippocratic ethic would also require physicians to honour a panoply of Ancient 
Gods.73 Momeyer does join Kass in suggesting that medicine’s end includes healing; 
unlike Kass, however, he believes the end to be stipulated by humans, rather than 
by nature,74 and he thinks that there are other important values also to be served in 
and by medicine, such as “respect for patient values, or preservation of patient 
dignity”.75 For underplaying such values, Momeyer charges Kass with favouring an 
illiberal, paternalistic prioritisation of the doctor’s view of the patient’s good.76 He 
admits that respect for autonomy is sometimes taken far and, like Miller and Brody, 
accepts that external arguments will have a bearing on the legitimacy of assisted 
dying.77 Ultimately, however, Momeyer rejects the idea that assistance in dying “is 
incompatible with the very nature of medicine or the essential identity of physicians 
as healers”.78  
                                                          
66 Miller and Brody (n 47) 12.  
67 Miller and Brody (n 47) 12-13. 
68 Miller and Brody (n 47) 13.  
69 Miller and Brody (n 47) 13. 
70 Miller and Brody (n 47) 14. 
71 Miller and Brody (n 47) 14.  
72 Miller and Brody (n 47) 15. 
73 R Momeyer, ‘Does physician assisted suicide violate the integrity of medicine?’ (1995) 20 Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy 13, 18. 
74 Momeyer (n 73) 17, 19. 
75 Momeyer (n 73) 20.  
76 Momeyer (n 73) 21. 
77 Momeyer (n 73) 22-23. 
78 Momeyer (n 73) 23. 
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4. The Integrity of Medicine: Neither Necessary nor Sufficient? 
 
Traditionalists therefore claim that assisted dying is incompatible with the integrity of 
medicine, but others maintain that, whilst not mandatory, neither is it incompatible. 
Both sides appear to reach these conclusions by writing assisted dying into or out of 
the essence of medicine from the outset. In so doing, each side begs the question as 
to whether assisted dying can be compatible with the integrity of medicine. Maybe 
this is not entirely problematic, if one or other of these accounts captures the 
essence (and internal morality) of medicine. As it is, however, we can dispute the 
necessity of each account and, correspondingly, each of the different answers given 
about medicine’s compatibility with assisted dying. Indeed, the fundamental question 
about the permissibility of assisted dying will still remain open even if a necessary 
account can be settled upon: we cannot hope to arrive at a sufficient answer to that 
question merely by reflecting on the nature and internal morality of medicine. Let us 
consider each of these problems in turn.  
First, we cannot establish which, if either, of the rival accounts is superior, in the 
sense that it offers a necessary view of the nature of medicine. Veatch identifies 
three problems with the entire enterprise of identifying an internal morality: first, 
medicine encompasses many roles and many ends; secondly, even within a single 
medical role, there may be more than one end being served; and, finally, even if we 
could determine a single end for medicine, an outside view will still be needed on the 
appropriateness of that end.79  
Veatch’s first two allegations initially undermine Miller and Brody’s position. Miller 
and Brody saw medicine as encompassing different goals and its core values as 
susceptible to evolution. Miller and Brody’s openness to the fact of change suggests 
that they are not directly concerned with the essential nature of medicine – unlike 
Pellegrino and, importantly, Fuller. Fuller wanted to capture the essence of law, 
whatever its rules happen to say and wherever they happen to be said. Like Miller 
and Brody, Veatch appears troubled by the complexity – and apparent impossibility – 
of the task of describing the goals of medicine. Notice, for example, how he 
comments: “The awful truth is that different cultures seem to shape the terrain of 
medicine very differently”.80 Mapping medicine – and its morals – seems, on this 
view, to be too vast a task, so we cannot hope to specify a single secure answer as 
to the rightness or wrongness of a particular activity like assisted dying.  
Veatch has a point but perhaps he, like Miller and Brody, is wrong to embark down 
this empirical avenue. The mere fact that, in practice, medicine has many goals and 
can accordingly encompass many means arguably tells us nothing about whether 
medicine, by definition, has any particular goal or goals, such that it should 
encompass only particular means. However, Veatch does appear to recognise that 
the alternative to the empirical avenue is a contestable conceptual cul-de-sac. As 
such, even if we seek to glean the essence of medicine, like Pellegrino, we still 
encounter difficulty. A more charitable reading of Veatch’s position would suggest 
that he disputes the feasibility of arriving at a suitably agreeable concept of 
medicine.81 Pellegrino, of course, offered a particular take on the essence of 
medicine. Perhaps, if we extend our charity to Miller and Brody, they too were 
seeking some sort of conceptual essence (albeit one that would be open to 
                                                          
79 Veatch (n 48) 628. 
80 Veatch (n 48) 631.  
81 We might similarly ask whether Fuller provides a defensible definition of the essence of law.  
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evolution). Both accounts do at least converge, albeit partially, on medicine’s 
concern with health and healing. The problem with even this essence is that it is still 
difficult to see what medicine, by definition, should therefore say about the legitimacy 
of assisted dying.  
“Medicine”, says Beauchamp, “is a vague and inherently contestable concept”.82 
“Health” seems no less elusive,83 since it can align with very different versions of 
value theory: perhaps health is about quality of life; perhaps it should be considered 
as, or in light of, an objective good (like life itself); or perhaps it requires reference to 
people’s own preferences.84 Pellegrino favours an objective account of health, which 
forbids the intentional ending of life; autonomy matters, but it is not the fundamental 
value. Miller and Brody, meanwhile, allow more room for preferences, although, in 
doing so, they skirt a very fine line between defending values internal to and external 
from medicine.85 Although they depict autonomy as a value outside the internal 
morality of medicine,86 these authors additionally suggest not only that it would be 
contrary to the endeavour to impose unwanted treatment on patients,87 but also that 
trust, which is essential to the endeavour, requires reference to patients’ considered 
judgments.88 In making these points, Miller and Brody either smuggle in values from 
outside medicine or they implicitly allow that the goals of medicine do include due 
regard for the patient’s autonomy. Certainly, their enthusiasm for autonomy is not 
unbridled: for example, they do not support death-on-demand as such.89 Yet, 
whatever role autonomy is playing in their particular argument, it still seems plausible 
that health and healing might require recourse to the patient’s own preferences; but, 
at the same time, we might also think that Pellegrino has a point about medicine’s 
concern with health as a more objective end.  
If medicine has an essence, we might suppose that one of these rival readings must 
be superior. Of course, determining the victor has proven – and will likely long prove 
– difficult.90 But maybe we do not need a single victor; perhaps, indeed, a dose of 
agnosticism can salvage the very enterprise of specifying the internal morality of 
medicine. Fuller, you will recall, restricted the concept of law to guiding action via 
rules, from which end particular norms then arose. He left open the question of the 
substantive content of the rules themselves. Perhaps we can do the same for 
medicine, for example by saying that medicine is all about health (from which 
particular norms will flow), but then declining to give any particular content to the 
concept of health. Leaving ourselves open to variation, somewhat akin to Miller and 
Brody, would allow us to focus on form as opposed to substance. Then, however, we 
would confront a new problem: we would be left with little (perhaps no) idea about 
what medicine should involve or require and, accordingly, about the legitimacy of 
assisted dying as judged from within medicine. And there is a bigger problem here: 
resolving the rightness of the different views thereon, and more specifically the right 
                                                          
82 TL Beauchamp, ‘Internal and External Standards for Medical Morality’ (2001) 26 Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy 601, 604. 
83 KM Boyd, ‘Disease, Illness, Sickness, Health, Healing and Wholeness: Exploring Some Elusive 
Concepts’ (2000) 26 Medical Humanities 9. 
84 See D Degrazia, ‘Value theory and the best interests standard’ (1995) 9 Bioethics 50.  
85 Beauchamp suspects that they ultimately prioritise external values: Beauchamp (n 82) 605-7. 
86 Miller and Brody (n 47) 12. 
87 Miller and Brody (n 47) 13. 
88 Miller and Brody (n 47) 15. 
89 Miller and Brody (n 47) 14.  
90 DeGrazia (n 84) and Beauchamp (n 82) make similar points about the varieties of value theory and 
moral theory, respectively.  
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answer to the question of death-on-demand, is not something we can achieve 
merely by looking to, and in, medicine.  
It appears that, even if we could resolve the end or essence of medicine, and 
thereby its means, this alone cannot tell us whether the end, essence or means, are 
good. As Dixon comments, “Whether a doctor's participation in active euthanasia is a 
violation of her integrity depends on whether the act is wrong, so we cannot without 
circularity use the concept of integrity to prove that it is wrong”.91 Dixon here appears 
to adopt an external view on integrity, in which integrity is not merely about one’s 
identity or deep desires, but is instead about standing for the (objectively) right 
things. Since, on this view, rightness is prior to (and constitutive of) integrity, we 
cannot reverse the order of priority and use integrity to establish rightness or 
wrongness. Of course, we might depart from Dixon and prefer to see integrity as tied 
to identity or desires. But even the individual (and, by extension, the group) that is 
integrated on such a basis cannot avoid external appraisal: I may sincerely cleave to 
certain values and ways of being, but I can still legitimately be subject to moral 
censure.92  
Here we reach Veatch’s third criticism, that even if we could determine an end for 
medicine, we will need an outside view on the appropriateness of that end. “The 
ends of promotion of health and healing”, says Veatch, “are themselves meaningless 
unless one turns outside medicine to know whether the ends are worth pursuing”.93 
Beauchamp joins him, in suggesting that an internal “morality is not self-justifying by 
its own internal norms”.94 Medicine’s ends, Veatch continues, are “inevitably derived 
from the ends of the human as seen – imperfectly – by the broader society”.95  
We therefore need to look beyond medicine in order to judge its practitioners’ 
activities. Implicit in the indications of Thorpe J et al is the idea that medicine is 
protected because it provides something of social value. Freedman would seem to 
endorse this interpretation, as he suggests that a profession – and therefore its 
internal morality – is granted a privileged position in, and by, society.  
“The internal morality of law …, as the internal morality of medicine, rests 
ultimately on society's commitment to preserving and ensuring continuation to 
a value through allocating it to be especially safeguarded by concerned 
professionals in society. By adopting a profession with its central value, 
society has given warrant to corollaries of that value to be pursued 
irrespective (sometimes) of, for example, simple considerations of utility”.96 
On this account, society wants medicine to protect its core values, whatever these 
happen to be.  
Here we return to where we began. Perhaps the judges had it right: the integrity of 
medicine, as a component of the public interest, deserves protection. Veatch, of 
course, would not want the purported integrity of medicine to do any heavy moral 
lifting. However, we should remain mindful of the aforementioned problem of (self-) 
disrespect.97 Maybe some room should be allowed for the profession’s self-
conception. But now our familiar problems also return: we cannot resolve what the 
                                                          
91 N Dixon, ‘On the Difference between Physician-Assisted Suicide and Active Euthanasia’ (1998) 28 
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93 Veatch (n 48) 635. 
94 Veatch (n 48) 607.  
95 Beauchamp (n 82) 639.  
96 Freedman (n 63) 17. 
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internal morality of medicine requires, allows or prohibits, as the necessary core is 
too amorphous and, even if we could, a view from within will be insufficient to resolve 
the general moral questions about what should be required, allowed or prohibited. If, 
then, we are seeking to resolve a general question about the legitimacy of assisted 
dying, we must look to the source of medicine’s purported legitimacy i.e. to morality 
and to the society in question. In short, we must turn to the public interest.  
 
5. Death-on-Demand and the Public Interest 
 
Unfortunately, the “public interest” is another amorphous concept. The sorts of 
claims that are usually advanced, in law, in the name of the public interest can be 
distinguished according to whose interests are in issue: my interests, your interests, 
or our interests.98 Sometimes (as we see in mental health law) my liberty will be 
limited in order to protect my welfare. Alternatively, there might be a public interest in 
protecting you from me – this is certainly a theme of the rulings denying death-on-
demand. Finally, the public interest will sometimes be said to protect us collectively, 
such as when a purportedly objective ethical principle, like the sanctity of human life, 
operates to prevent contrary demands from being met.  
Yet, the law appears to lack a consistent or clear approach to the public interest. 
Although life sometimes trumps choice, in-roads have been made into the sanctity of 
life,99 and sometimes choice does trump life (specifically if the claim is “allow me to 
die”). Neither is it clear how the particular interests – in autonomy, say, or welfare – 
are being conceptualised or even the level at which they operate. For example, 
some judges depict autonomy as a private interest,100 whilst others see respect for 
autonomy as part of the public interest: 
“There are some moral values, of which the state is the proper guardian, with 
no rational or utilitarian justification, but which are nevertheless accepted 
because they are fundamental to our humanity and to our respect for our own 
kind. The principle of autonomy is one of these values”.101 
On this account, autonomy stands shoulder-to-shoulder with the sanctity of life. The 
problem, of course, is that each happens in fact to compete with the other, with 
neither emerging wholly victorious in law. Can a victor be found in principle?  
In order to determine a victor, we need an account of what the public interest should 
encompass, and how it should resolve the different claims that are advanced by 
different individuals and groups. According to Held, accounts of the public interest 
tend to fall into three categories: preponderance (or aggregative) theories; unitary 
theories; and common interest theories.102 Each deploys a different concept of 
“interest” and differs in its conception of the relationship between the public interest 
and the interests of individuals.  
Preponderance theories adopt a subjective account of “interests”, in which 
individuals determine their interests according to their preferences.103 The public 
interest therefore aggregates these preferences, in a utilitarian fashion, and the 
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general will dictates matters of social policy. According to such an approach, the 
public interest requires respect for autonomy – or, at least, respect for the 
autonomous choices of the majority. This leaves the account susceptible to the 
charge that no practicable mechanism exists “for determining what is in the interest 
of a preponderance of individuals”.104 Furthermore, the minority – whoever these are 
– seems doomed to lose out. We see these sorts of difficulties arise in relation to 
assisted dying. Do a majority of people genuinely want the option of death-on-
demand?105 And, even if they did, can the interests of the minority be sufficiently 
protected if such a policy is adopted?  
Unitary theories take a different approach. Here, the public interest is an overriding 
interest, which is tied to objective accounts of the good, and thus to what people 
should want or should receive.106 The problem with this approach is that it will be 
difficult to determine that which serves – or pleases – everyone. Specifying the 
objective good is notoriously difficult: for example, life might generally be worth 
protecting, but not everyone will want such protection at all times. There are echoes, 
here, of the problems that Momeyer detected with Kass’ position on the internal 
morality of medicine, since we run the risk of affording too little room to autonomous 
choice.  
Perhaps common interest theories can fare better. Here, the interests in question are 
those that all individuals have in common. Barry, for example, combines subjective 
and objective positions. Individuals should be free to pursue their own conceptions of 
the good life and it is in the public interest to ensure that they have the opportunities 
to do so.107 People will advance quite different claims, but Barry recommends 
looking to the elements that are common and universalisable: these make up the 
distinctive public interest. For Barry, the public interest refers to the promotion of 
collective welfare (broadly defined), but it is not the only consideration when 
designing public policy. Sometimes the public interest will conflict with other 
considerations. So, for example, there might be a public interest in ensuring public 
safety. If one individual is to benefit from such an interest, then so must everyone 
else. Certainly, some will fall foul of a rule designed to ensure public safety; they 
might feel, for example, that they should not be imprisoned.108 Such concerns can be 
addressed in the ways in which the rules are designed or applied. As such, there 
might be other goals which the public will occasionally choose to prioritise over the 
collective good; equally, sometimes, subjective preferences will give way to other 
important goals. As McHarg clarifies, “The balance struck between competing 
interests and goals in any situation will inevitably reflect a value choice, but not one 
which purports to eradicate the initial conflict”.109 McHarg admits, however, that a 
common interest theory might still be of limited application, since people will not 
agree about the goals that society should adopt or the best means of achieving 
these goals. Identifying the group’s goals will also be complex, although democratic 
processes seem to offer the best chances.  
                                                          
104 A McHarg, ‘Reconciling Human Rights and the Public Interest: Conceptual Problems and Doctrinal 
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How might a common interest theory apply to the case of assisted dying? If we 
follow McHarg, we might see a prima facie case for allowing the practice, if this 
reflects the public will.110 Yet, the question will remain about whether the practice 
contributes in some way to the collective good. As McHarg noted, a value choice 
must ultimately be made. So which values should dictate our appraisals of, and 
policy responses to, assisted dying?  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Determining the proper content of, and role to be played by, the public interest will 
therefore involve a value choice – about the interests in issue and also about the 
proper balance to be struck between protecting individuals and protecting others 
(including society at large). We well know that the values associated with death and 
dying remain hotly contested. Determining the legitimacy of assistance in dying 
involves a genuine moral dilemma, in which it is difficult to know which way to jump. 
The integrity of medicine seems not to offer a secure answer.111 Resolving the 
question by reference to what doctors happen to think seems to be an insufficient 
basis for determining policy, given the wider interests at stake.112 At the same time, 
no single answer appears (necessarily) to emerge from the concept of medicine – 
but, even if one did, this too would be insufficient. The integrity of medicine is 
therefore part of, but by no means exhausts, the public interest. Unfortunately, when 
we widen the pool of interests, we find that we are still required to make a value 
choice.  
Perhaps the right choice will one day be revealed, and a principled answer will be 
found to the enduring euthanasia question. But perhaps that is a pipe dream, given 
that the different answers – which alternately emphasise choice, suffering, and the 
intrinsic value of life – continue to be both commended and condemned.113 Maybe, 
as Hoffmann LJ once indicated, the law can live with the conflicts:  
“A conflict between the principles of the sanctity of life and the individual’s 
right of self-determination may ... require a painful compromise to be made... 
There must be an accommodation between principles, both of which seem 
rational and good, but which have come into conflict with each other”.114  
The law achieves this accommodation in a variety of ways: in some situations, 
autonomy triumphs; on other occasions, the sanctity of life wins out; and, although 
the law purports to prohibit assistance in dying, ways are usually found to secure 
humane disposals for those who do so.115  
In such endeavours, the law reveals itself to be open to different accounts of the 
good life. Indeed, the judges admit that they will have regard for the different values 
present in society, and that they will adapt the law as society evolves:  
“The determination of the public interest is a matter for the courts, applying, 
subject to any statutory provisions which may be relevant, the common law... 
[T]he common law is capable of moving with the times to meet changing 
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conditions so that as far as possible it reflects the acceptable standards of the 
day”.116 
Maybe there is a case for such value pluralism or “value agnosticism” in the law.117 
Maybe, too, there is a principled case for the adoption of middle ground positions, 
given the considerable complexity and uncertainty which cloud practices like 
assistance in dying.118 Indeed, even if the law does edge towards embracing death-
on-demand,119 it must remain not only appropriately “moralised”,120 but also alert to 
the need to secure an “appropriate pay-off between allowing so much liberty than an 
excess of harm results, and such restricted liberty that people have too little control 
of their lives to make them worthwhile”.121 At the same time, the law must also work 
as law: it must be clear and consistent, and thus observant of criteria like those of 
Fuller’s “internal morality”, if its rules are to guide people as they should. These are 
matters for elsewhere.122 For now, I hope to have shown that appeals to the integrity 
of medicine, “proper medical treatment”, and even the public interest cannot resolve 
the values choices we must make whenever death-on-demand is in issue.  
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